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Coordinating Regional Policy in the EU
  EU  regional  policy  is  an  instrument  to  promote  development  in  economically
weaker areas of Europe as well as to facilitate integration and ensure the success of the
single market (European Commission, 2003). The territorial nature of EU regional policy
demands complex coordination among various levels of government as well as across
several policy sectors. Coordination, however, is often unsuccessful. Vertical
coordination, inherently necessary for regional policy, is often precluded due to power
struggles among supranational, national and regional governments. Likewise, conflicting
policy goals and competing interests across policy sectors curtails the achievement of
cross-sectoral coordination. Challenges to cross-sectoral coordination often arise since
regional policy, based upon redistribution and Keynesian economics, has found itself at
odds with underlying principles of the EU, namely neo-liberalism and free market
competition.
Goals of regional policy often parallel the aims of other policy sectors, namely the
environment and enlargement. On the other hand, regional policy may conflict or
interface with other sectors such as competition and agricultural policies respectively.
Regional policy necessitates cross-sectoral coordination within the European
Commission across relevant Directorate Generals (DGs), with other EU institutions, as
well as vertical coordination among various levels of government. Pressures for cross-
sectoral coordination emerge due to budgetary concerns, the desire to improve policies or
to comply with legal requirements. The Commission’s Regional Policy DG has found it
not only essential to coordinate with other DGs, but also to seek vertical coordination
with member states as well as regions and municipalities. Pressures for coordination
among the Regional Policy DG, member states and regions have emerged to achieve
better implementation of policies and to enhance financial management of funds.
Success of vertical coordination among levels of government varies, however, due
to institutional/constitutional constraints within member states and the extent to which
each state guards their own sovereignty. Federal or quasi-federal systems facilitate
greater inclusion of regional governments in the creation and implementation of EU3
regional policy. Yet, even within the same member state there may be variations of
regional inclusion in coordinating EU regional policy since some regions have stronger
institutional capacities than others (Dudek, 2001). Also, regions may seek greater
participation with the EU rather than their national government in creating and
implementing regional policy as a way to gain more autonomy from their central
government (Smyrl, 1997; Conzelman, 1995). As a result of territorial governance and
the inevitable power struggle among levels of government, the extent to which vertical
coordination can be achieved may be very limited.
  The  implementation  of  regional  policy  demands  local  and  regional  actors,  both
public and private, to play a significant role (Cini, 2001; Hooghe 1996). Member states
also have an important function since the EU’s structure is mostly shaped by member
state representation and subnational levels are only provided an advisory role in the
Committee of the Regions. Thus, the relation among central and regional governments
with the Commission is vital to the coordination of regional policy, both in its
formulation and implementation. However, tensions often emerge among levels of
government as each seeks to have a greater role in regional development.
Vertical Coordination among the Commission, Member States and Regions
  Structural  funds are one  of  the main financial  tools of  EU regional  policy. The
structural funds reform of 1988 was created to significantly alter the Commission’s
coordination of funds with national and regional governments. Internal pressures from
within the Commission advocated a stronger role for regions in order to improve the
effectiveness of funds. In the end, however, coordination between regions and the
Commission was not as effective and far reaching as assumed due to constitutional
constraints within member states and member states’ “jealousies” regarding sovereignty
and tensions among government levels.
Prior to 1989, structural funds were doled out to specific projects that were co-
financed and member states played a major role in the decision to create and implement
projects. Within the Regional Policy DG it became clear that a case by case distribution
of projects was not adequate to promote the wealth generating capacity of worse off
regions (Meadows, interview by author 2003). Structural funds reform was an attempt to4
“transform a system of financial reimbursements into a policy where decisions and
resources are shared among European, national and subnational actors” (Hooghe,
1997:89). In 1988, under the initiative of Commission President Jacques Delors,
structural fund allocations doubled to the detriment of cohesion funds, which national
governments control and distribute. Under the “partnership principle” structural funds
were to take on a new focus to empower the regions. This principle was to ensure the
participation of regional and local authorities in the adoption and implementation of
regional development programs made possible through EU co-financing.
The “partnership principle” was an attempt to make EU regional policies more
efficient and effective. An assumption underlying the principle was that regional policy
makers would be more adept at evaluating their regional economies and would be better
able to determine the mechanisms necessary to improve regional conditions. In addition,
the Commission had hoped to lessen regional dependence on national government
resources and to allow regional actors greater discretion (Smyrl, 1997).
  A  schism  within  the  Commission  emerged  regarding  what  role  subnational
governments should play or in other words to what extent partnership should be applied.
Creation of the 1988 reform was strongly contested both within the Commission and
across member states. The Commission, however, did not work as a unitary actor and a
small group, with the support of then Commission President Jacques Delors, created the
basis of the reform (Hooghe, 1997). As a result, other DGs that the reform affected
resented being forced to conform to these changes (Hooghe, 1997). The group
surrounding Delors, who were the innovators of the reform, established DG XXII
Coordination of Structural Policy which would coordinate funds in such a way as to
“maximize subnational input in structural programming” to facilitate stronger relations
between regional/local authorities and the EU (Hooghe, 1997:93). Counter to DG XXII,
the Regional Policy DG desired a more flexible approach, whereby the extent to which
sub national governments would participate in the system would not be uniform across all
member states. By 1992, the Regional Policy DG’s approach prevailed and DG XXII was
eliminated.
Hooghe (1997) asserts that pressure to not achieve fully the partnership principle
and empower regional-EU relations had more to do with internal divisions in the5
Commission regarding how to deal with subnational administrations. On the other hand,
others suggest that the realization of the “partnership principle” has varied across
countries and has been limited due to internal member state practices (Meadows,
interview by author 2003; White, interview by author, 2003). It seems that constitutional
constraints and national government attempts to preclude regional governments from
gaining more autonomy have inhibited the realization of partnership.
With the emergence of the partnership principle, optimism grew for the
empowerment of the regions through EU financing (Conzelmann, 1995).
The Commission (1996) asserts that,
…partnership has been (another) operating principle of the Structural
Funds since 1989. It involves close collaboration between the Commission
and the relevant authorities at national, regional or local level appointed by
each Member State, at all programming stages. Since 1994, this close
consultation has extended to competent authorities and bodies -including,
within the framework of each Member State’s national rules and current
practices, the economic and social partner designated by the Member
States […] the provision is made that the partnership will be conducted in
full compliance with the respective institutional, legal and financial
powers of each of the partners (p.17).
The wording of the partnership principle, although optimistic to achieve more
participation of lower levels of government, still leaves the final say to member states and
is dependent upon their respective institutional structure (Colino, 1996; Dudek 2001).
Director General Graham Meadows asserts that there are political rivalries and jealousies
between levels of government (interview by author, 2003). As a result, member states
have attempted to maintain their sovereignty over their territorial administrations. There
often is a hierarchy between the national and regional levels of government making the
national government the main legislator and executive of regional policies. On the other
hand, many EU member states have increased devolution of policy competencies to
lower levels of government, making decentralization a major trend in European politics
(Sharpe, 1993; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1990). Devolution has promoted greater
coordination between levels of government regarding regional policy, but in many
member states much more needs to be done.6
Barriers to coordination among levels of government are intensified when a
policy area was once the domain of the national government, For instance, regional
development policies existed at the national level prior to EU involvement, yet, some
forms of social policy, such as the 1997 EU Employment Policy which supported
national labour markets had not existed at the national level before. Thus, tensions may
be less in some policy areas, which were not part of the national governments’ domain,
whereas, regional policy, which traditionally was the responsibility of national
governments can create tension as national governments struggle to maintain their
competencies
1.
Examining individual countries it becomes clear that each state has a different
way of organizing territorial administrations. For example, the UK, Ireland and Portugal,
traditionally unitary states, have maintained mechanisms to keep control of central
authorities. In the UK there is little low level taxation and although the EU has pushed to
give more powers to counties, this has not been achieved (White, interview by author,
2003). One instance is the way in which British Regional Development Authorities
operate, whereby in actuality they are ultimately responsible to Whitehall. Similarly, in
Portugal regional authorities are relatively weak compared to their regional counterparts
in other member states and must report to Lisbon regarding regional development policy
implementation. Ireland as well manages the implementation of structural funds mostly
from the central government. Conversely, France has made a genuine attempt to
decentralize and to give more responsibility to the prefects (White, interview by author,
2003). Coordination between the Regional Policy DG and the regions varies across
member states depending upon the extent to which regions have policy-making and
implementation competencies.
With regards to coordination between the EU and member states, there are both
formal and informal consultation opportunities available between the Commission and
member states. Two to three times each year member states meet with the Regional
Policy DG, annual reports are written by member states and distributed to the
Commission, and member states also compose midterm reports of the five year structural
funds programs that are also distributed to the Commission. In addition, Commission7
members visit areas to evaluate the implementation of funds and programs. Independent
evaluators are also brought in to serve an additional oversight function.
A recent initiative to help with the coordination between member
states/subnational governments and the Commission was the creation of a task force
established in summer 2003. Fifteen individuals from across the Commission’s DGs
served on this task force. The purpose of the task force is to interpret regulations and to
ensure that there is harmonization of reform. The way the task force operates is that
member states, once they create or implement a program present it to the task force and
the task force examines whether the policy is being handled appropriately. Currently, the
task force is being tested, but may become the blueprint for something more permanent
(Petzold, interview by author, 2003).
Sometimes coordination among the Commission, member states and regions can
be difficult since they have different priorities and goals than the Commission. For
instance, member state elected officials need to provide benefits to their constituencies to
maintain substantive legitimacy, which will hopefully ultimately keep them in office. As
a result, member states will either bend their policies to fit those of the EU or bend EU
policies to fit their own (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). Although EU policies
attempt to influence or change member state practices, member states also try to maintain
their own policies, and as a result little change in policy may actually occur. For example,
the EU may make a request for a member state to adopt a policy initiative. The member
state will then enter into a bargaining with the EU as to how the policy will be adopted.
In the end, as a result of bargaining back and forth, emerges a watered down version of
the EU’s original policy that looks more like the member state’s original policy. The
appearance is that the member state has adopted an EU policy, but in reality little change
has really occurred (Meadows, interview by author, 2003).
Resistance to directives from Brussels can weaken the coordination of regional
policies among EU regions and member states. Often times EU initiatives run counter to
national and regional governments’ views on how to achieve development (White,
interview by author, 2003). When regional and national governments have their own
vision of how policy goals should be achieved this can clash with European policies.
Thus, often times the Court of Auditors may find that policies did not conform to the8
EU’s mandate, however, in actuality it was just that national and regional governments
felt that certain policy goals should be achieved in a different way. For instance, the
Natura 2000 program stipulates that regions need to put aside a certain amount of land for
environmentally protected areas as a condition for receiving funds. The Natura 2000
program’s stipulations have significant implications for regional and national leaders
since they are unable to develop as they deem appropriate (White, interview by author,
2003). As a result, however, the EU is able to achieve its policy goals without a working
coordination with member states, but rather with an EU legal mandate.
Although member states often try to maintain authority over their territory and
resist direct EU intervention in regional development,
2 some regional authorities have
made a concerted effort to coordinate regional policy formation and implementation with
the EU. Both the Regional Policy DG and regional governments have attempted to
facilitate better interaction and coordination of regional policies. First, regional
administrations over time have experienced an institutional learning curve whereby
bureaucrats and policymakers at the regional level have become more skilled how better
to use EU funds and to implement EU programs (Dudek, 2003). Regional public
administrations have created administrative units to deal with EU policies and fund
distribution. In addition, over time bureaucrats have learned about the opportunities
available from the EU to promote economic development within their region.
Second, regional governments have established lobbying groups in Brussels.
These lobbies collect information about current events, programs and issues in the EU
and report back to their region. In addition, the lobbying groups act as ‘mini-embassies’
to represent the interests of their region at the EU level. Some members of the Regional
Policy DG, however, suggest that these lobbies do not necessarily present new innovative
ideas that are not already circulating within the Commission (Petzold, interview by
author, 2003). It is difficult to assess the success of regional lobbies in influencing the
Commission; however, it does provide a “back door” relationship between regions and
the EU. Formally, the Regional Policy DG meets with regional lobby offices four times
per year to brief them on current issues. Informally, regional lobbies hold seminars for
members of the Commission to demonstrate examples of good practice with EU funds.
This gives Regional Policy DG officials ideas on how to improve policies or how9
innovation can occur. In addition to these seminars regional offices also hold parties that
are often well attended and can bring the attention of a region to members of the
Commission.
Even the newest members to join the EU in 2004 have taken the initiative to
establish relations among regional and national officials with the Commission. There has
been variation, however, among the acceding countries’ abilities to lobby. One of the
more organized and ambitious lobbying efforts have come from Poland (White, interview
by author, 2003). Working with new member states and regions will add to the challenge
of the Regional Policy DG to coordinate policy implementation and formulation. If these
governments begin early to understand better the EU and its regional programs it may
facilitate enhanced policy coordination and implementation.
Third, informal contacts between the Regional Policy DG and regions also exist
to create a community of individuals dedicated to regional development. Approximately
20,000-30,000 fulltime employees are dedicated to working with structural funds within
member states (Petzold, interview by author, 2003). In order to facilitate a network of
like minded individuals dedicated to regional development, the Commission has
attempted to preserve informal links with regional actors. The Commission, for example,
sponsors seminars on best practice, to try to educate regional actors on how to best
implement regional policies. The informal links between the Commission and regions has
facilitated the creation of networks between these levels of government. Informal
mechanisms have been essential to facilitate the working of established formal
mechanisms (Meadows, interview by author, 2003).
Pressure for coordination between regional administrations and the Commission
are both explicit and implicit. The “partnership principle” certainly sets an explicit goal
of coordination, but in practice it has not quite achieved as extensive an outcome due to
constitutional constraints. Thus, other implicit mechanisms have emerged to promote
coordination in order to improve the implementation of funds and financial management.
Links between the regions and the Commission have promoted innovation and models of
“good practice” that can help other regions. Budgetary pressures within the Commission
and need for improved oversight have also facilitated the growth of coordination between
the Commission and regional authorities. Although the effectiveness of coordination has10
been stunted due to tensions of territorial authority with member states, it seems that over
time and with institutional learning the coordination between regions and the
Commission can improve. However, limits on coordination among government levels
could be exacerbated with the most recent 2007-2013 structural funds program, which
does not emphasise coordination, but rather greater involvement of national and regional
governments (European Commission, 2004). If member states and their regions are to
have a greater role, this may only invite less coordination and more domestic “turf wars”
between national and lower levels of government regarding creation and implementation
of regional policy.
Regional Policy Coordination across EU Institutions
  In  addition  to  coordination  among  levels  of  government,  coordination  is  also
needed across EU institutions. Coordination with other EU institutions is often times
explicit to ensure better implementation and oversight. For example, coordination with
the European Investment Bank (EIB) is legally bound since regional capital investment
for infrastructure or social concerns must coordinated between the Regional Policy DG
and the EIB. Another explicit coordination is the requirement for the Regional Policy DG
to present regular Cohesion Reports to all institutions on a regular basis. The European
Parliament (EP) coordinates and in essence plays an oversight function over regional
policies through its control of the “purse strings”. Additionally, each year the EP presents
approximately 400 parliamentary questions regarding structural funds. All questions and
answers are published in the Official Journal. The Court of Auditors also plays a
significant oversight function through its inquiries regarding proper spending of funds,
which can affect how funds are later coordinated at the national and regional levels.
  Coordination  with  the  Council  of  the  EU,  however, has  been less  with  the
Regional Policy DG, than with other DGs since there is no regional policy ministry at the
national level. As a result, there is no council on regional policy in the Council of the EU.
In 1990 there was an attempt to have better coordination with the Council of Ministers
through the then newly created Council of Spatial Planning. The Spatial Planning
Council later disappeared. If you examine other policy areas such as agriculture, social
policy or the environment each has a council. As a result, coordination with the Council11
is rather soft, however, it is within the Council that real power is wielded (Meadows,
interview by author, 2003). For example, one of the key concerns that the Regional
Policy DG will face is regarding Agenda 2007, whereby net payers may find regional
policies more costly and net beneficiaries will have to pressure to get funds in the next
five year program (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). Since finance ministers votes
are kept anonymous this detracts from the coordination ability of the Regional Policy DG
to work with finance ministers who will give the ultimate word on subsequent five year
programs.
  Consultation  rather  than  coordination  is  organized  with  the  Committee  of  the
Regions (CoR). The CoR basically goes along with regional policy initiatives and
supports and represents them before other EU institutions, since they have more to lose
not defending regional policy programs.
Within the Commission there has been recent discussion of changing the multi-
fund approach to a mono-fund approach to improve the implementation of policies. Since
the Berlin Summit in 1999, and even prior, there have been pressures within the
Commission toward greater simplification and centralization. The main motivation for
changing the programs is to improve coordination of policies “on the ground” in order to
enhance implementation. Thus, coordination even within the Regional Policy DG and
within the Commission has been explicitly addressed due to budgetary pressures and the
desire to improve policy outcomes and simplify implementation.
Cross-Sectoral Policy Coordination
Regional policy often intersects with other policies making cross-sectoral
coordination essential at the policy creation and implementation stages to improve
efficiency and effectiveness of policies, to avoid contradiction and redundancy as well as
maximize budgetary resources (Peters, 2005). As Schout and Jordan (2005) suggest,
policy networks across policy sectors and among levels of government often do not
successfully coordinate. One of the reasons for a lack of policy coordination across
sectors is that the goals of each sector vary (Peters, 2005).
An EU project to renovate the historic Le Havre Port in France, once the center of
trans-Atlantic trade, demonstrates the very different goals policy sectors have for the12
same development project. The Environment DG became interested in the project since
the renovation would adversely affect the nesting and feeding grounds for rare sea birds,
thus the port was of biological and environmental interest. In addition the Transportation
DG was concerned about the project since the harbour was a major trading port; thereby
sharing with the Regional Policy DG its concern over economic significance. The
Regional Policy DG saw the harbour as a major employer and thus for developmental
purposes also became involved in the project.
  To deal  with this project, like many other projects two types of coordination took
place: 1) coordination of the DGs when the decision for a program is taken in the
abstract, and 2) coordination at the time of implementation (Meadows, interview by
author, 2003). At the point of implementation the member states or regions need to work
with the EU, or at least within the framework of the EU’s stated program, to facilitate
policy implementation. During the time of policy formulation, the DGs need to work
together to design a plan to meet the needs of regional development, along with other
policy initiatives. Although coordination among DGs is required by law, it does not occur
in the same manner across various policy sectors. Some policy sectors may find that their
goals intersect with regional policy, whereas other policy sectors may find their goals at
odds with those of regional policy.
Regional policy in the EU differs from the formation of policy in other sectors
within the EU. In particular, policy coordination of regional policy most notably differs
from coordination of social policy. Regional policy has not been explicitly coordinated
like social policy with the open-method of coordination. Thus, regional policy, as
compared to other policy sectors does not have legal mechanism for coordination, but
rather uses soft laws, rules and regulations (Petzold, interview by author, 2003). Pressures
do exist to try to coordinate the Regional Policy DG with other DGs. Most pressures are
either in order to achieve a desirable outcome quickly, such as meeting environmental
concerns or due to budgetary pressures to have the most effective and efficient usage of
funds.
  Michelle Cini  (2001)  suggests  that coherence  within  policy  areas is  possible,  but
coherence across policy areas is more problematic. She asserts that horizontal relations
across DGs tend to be weak. One way to coordinate an initiative across policy sectors is13
to use inter-service coordination, whereby interested DGs may contribute to the “content
of a draft and identify implications for their own policy responsibilities (Cini, 2001: 11).
However, inter-service consultation does not necessarily work as effectively as thought.
For instance, short time limits put upon the circulation of a file has made it difficult to
give adequate consideration to draft proposals (Cini, 2001). Cini (2001) also suggests that
the physical housing of DGs in different buildings may also contribute to the lack of
coordination. Prior to 1999 Commissioners were housed within the same building
allowing for coordination and consultation to take place at an informal level whereby
cabinet members could stop in to talk to other members (Cini, 2001). Since 1999,
however, under Romano Prodi Commissioners are now based within the same buildings
as their DGs. Although the move was to improve coordination between Commissioners
and their DG, it may adversely affect coordination across DGs (Cini, 2001)
  Members  working  within  the  Regional  Policy  DG,  however,  suggest  that  there  are
interpersonal informal interactions which help to facilitate coordination (White, interview
by author, 2003). The bureaucratic personnel of the Commission are less in number than
state bureaucracies, there is a great deal of staff movement across DGs and there is little
competition among staff members since they have similar salary scales (White, interview
by author, 2003). The basic corporate culture of the Commission, unlike some state
bureaucracies, is amicable and there are no “turf wars”, thus when contentious issues do
emerge they are not insurmountable (White, interview by author, 2003).
  Pressure for the Regional  Policy  DG  to coordinate with  other DGs, however, does
exist. One reason why regional policy is coordinated with other policy areas is in an
effort to achieve the aims of other policy sectors. Stipulations required to be met in order
to receive EU structural funds can be an effective way to achieve policy goals. The
“carrot-stick” method forces regions and member states to implement policies associated
with other policy sectors that may not have been achieved otherwise. For example,
regional funds provide money for cleaning and improving old, dirty industries, promoting
rural development, and improving drinking water; all of which are programs that not only
further regional economic development, but also improve environmental conditions.
Without the “strings attached” to structural funds, such environmental concerns may not
be addressed as quickly otherwise.14
  Budgetary  concerns  are  another  reason  why  pressure  exists  for  coordination.  The
EU seeks to have the most output per euro spent. For example, the purpose of social
policy is to increase productivity, decrease unemployment and increase economic growth.
To realise these goals investment and job training are needed. Meanwhile, regional
policies are created to achieve increased employment and increased labour force
participation. Therefore, output per euro can be increased if social and regional policies
are implemented in a coordinated fashion (Meadows, interview by author, 2003).
  Drafting  of  the  structural  funds  program  beyond  2006  was  a  new  budgetary
concern that prompted the Regional Policy DG to seek greater coordination with other
DGs. One of the difficult issues was to decide what regulations would be applied to
distribute funds since an EU with twenty five members will change the comparative
economic difference among regions. Some regions within the fifteen member EU, that
currently qualify for structural funds, will be phased out under the 2007-2013 program
criteria to accommodate an enlarged EU of twenty five. Thus, due to budgetary and rule
making pressures a coordination of regional policy with other DGs will be implemented.
Under the 1988 structural funds reform, the Regional Policy DG is to coordinate with
other DGs. In light of the new acceding countries and the need to change the current
budgetary rules that dictate which funds intervene in which regions, the Regional Policy
DG met with other relevant DGs to discuss reforming the budgetary rules. In spring of
2004 a task force within the Regional Policy DG was established to facilitate
coordination with other DGs. The task force met with members of other DGs to hammer
out new budgetary rules.
  Success  of  cross-sectoral  coordination  of  regional  policy,  however,  varies
depending on the extent to which policies’ goals interface or conflict. Competition,
regulatory and research and development policies often times run counter to the goals of
regional policy. As a result there is little incentive for coordination since policy networks
are self-organizing and do not find it in their best interest to coordinate (Schout and
Jordan, 2005). Even when policies such as agriculture interface with regional policy there
emerges “turf wars” across policies that preclude coordination. Whereas, other policies
that interface with regional policy such as the environment and enlargement have found
mechanisms to coordinate both at the creation and implementation stages of15
policymaking. To understand better the variation in coordination success across policy
sectors let us examine policies most relevant to regional policy: competition and
regulatory policies, research and development, agriculture, environment and enlargement.
Competition and Regulatory Policy
Regional policy, based upon ideals of Keynesian economic runs contrary to neo-
classical assumptions underlying competition policy. Thus, the question emerges how
competition and regional policy can work together to the benefit of the EU. Conflict has
arisen, for example, regarding the eligibility for EU regional policy funding and national
state aid strategies. National state aid strategies have attempted to reduce grants to
promote greater competition, whereas, structural funds’ purpose is to provide aid
(Petzold, interview by author, 2003).
  Although  the policy  goals of competition and regional policy  are at odds, they  can
also be reconciled. In particular, historically the accession of new member states, namely
Spain and Portugal, necessitated strong regional policies to counter the negative impact
due to competition from countries with stronger economies and industries. Many scholars
suggest that structural and cohesion policy provided side payments for membership and
facilitated the achievement of the single market even with the addition of countries with
weaker economies (Allen, 1996).
  However,  competition  policy  often  creates  adverse  conditions  for  regions,
necessitating greater need for EU regional funds. Likewise, regulatory policy and its
territorial implications also have exacerbated regional economic inequalities (Dudek,
2005). EU competition and regulatory policies have unintentionally contradicted regional
policy goals; however, it seems that although coordination could perhaps lessen the
negative impact upon regional development there seems to be little movement to push for
coordination. Lack of coordination seems to be associated with the distinct principles
underlying the logic of these policies.
Research and Development Policy
Improving research and development can help to realize greater regional
economic development. The Research DG funds programs for cross-regional research16
projects. Programs are awarded to those proposals that are the most promising. As a
result, funds are usually distributed to more well-off regions since they have the capacity
to write better proposals and have the infrastructure to support stronger projects. Thus,
EU research funding works counter to EU regional policy since more well off regions
usually benefit (White, interview by author, 2003). EU regional policy also distributes
funds to research and development, but these funds are invested into cross-border
research infrastructure rather than determinate projects. Usually, such funds are allocated
to poorer regions to help them “catch-up” to richer regions.
  In its initial  stages, the Regional Policy DG worked with the Research DG to see
if they could model their programs to the Research DG’s programs, however, it was later
found that the goals of these two DGs were too divergent and thus, future coordination
was not sought (White, interview by author, 2003). The Regional Policy DG has
established its own formula to implement research and development programs. Thus,
differing policy goals precluded further coordination between these policies.
Agricultural Policy
  Agricultural  policy  and  regional  policy  in  many  ways  work  hand  in  hand.
Agriculture over time has become an increasingly declining sector, and as a result many
who worked in farming have found themselves unemployed. Most regions that qualitfy
for EU regional funds are dependent upon agriculture. Thus, regional policy, if properly
applied can soften the impact of the decline in agriculture (Meadows, interview by
author, 2003). In addition, some of the structural funds, whose rules and funding comes
from the Regional Policy DG, relate directly to agricultural concerns. Namely the
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), aids the adaptation of
agricultural structures and rural development and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries’
Guidance (FIFG), is aimed at improving the fishing sector while “achieving a balance
between conservation and the management of resources, on the one hand, and the fishing
effort and the stable and rational exploitation of those resources.” (European
Commission, 1996:82).
  EAGGF  and  FIFG  are  EU  regional  policy  programs  that  specifically  relate  to
agriculture and as a result have caused some tensions since the goals of the Agricultural17
and Regional Policy DGs are quite different. The Regional Policy DG created these funds
to improve total area diversification, whereas the Agriculture DG has sought to
implement these funds to achieve farm diversification (Meadows, interview by author,
2003). Currently both the Regional Policy and Agricultural Policy DGs distribute
EAGGF and FIFG. To improve the distribution and implementation of these funds it has
been decided that the Agricultural Policy DG will now handle the distribution of EAGGF
and FIFG in an attempt to have greater integrity of territorial development (Meadows,
interview by author, 2003). Other regional policy funds will remain within the Regional
Policy DG. Thus, it seems that coordination of agriculture and regional development
policy has not been sought, but rather responsibility was simply moved from one DG to
another. Although coordination of agricultural and regional policy seems advantageous to
avoid the pitfalls of redundancy, contradiction or missing to address the problem  it
seems that policy networks left to their own devices have not moved toward coordination
(Peters, 2005).
Environmental Policy
Environmental and regional policies go hand-in-hand. Particularly following the
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, environmental policy was strongly
incorporated into European integration (Cini, 2001). Specifically, the Amsterdam Treaty,
placed sustainable development with “priority attached to maintaining a high level of
environmental protection” at the centre of the union (European Commission, 2003b; Cini,
2001). Article 6 of the Treaty explicitly stated that “environmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Community
policies” (European Commission, 2003b).
Regional Policy DG has taken the incorporation of environmental policy into its
regional policies to heart. As stated in the Regional Policy DG’s, “Structural actions in
support of the environment”:
Such integration is a reality for regional development and the environment
which, far from being contradictory, are necessarily complementary… The
European Commission consequently ensures that projects developed under
regional policy are respectful of the environment: an assessment of their
environmental impact must be conducted by the Member States concerned
(European Commission, 2003b).18
  Initially,  regional  policy  did  not  include  environmental  concerns.  For  example,
structural fund guidelines did not include environmental objectives. Often, industrial
projects with ecological ramifications were funded without regard to their environmental
impact, and there was “rarely a requirement to undertake an environmental impact
assessment” (Cini, 2001:33). By the late 80’s Environmental Policy Integration became a
treaty obligation and with the structural funds reform of 1988, regional policy
incorporated environmental concerns as part of the “partnership principle” (Cini, 2001).
The actual policy results, however, were not as far reaching as hoped (Lenschow, 1997).
By 1993 the ERDF was reformed and improved the environmental considerations for
ERDF. A standard was set to include in all development plans an “appraisal of the
environmental situation and an evaluation of environmental impact, strategies and
operation” (Cini, 2001:34).
  Director  General  Graham  Meadows  points  out  that  “structural  policy  facilitates
implementation of environmental policy” in two ways: 1) direct investment for
environmental purposes, 2) provides an incentive within the system to adopt
environmental policies (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). Regarding direct
investment, structural funds provide “financing for projects which aim to improve the
quality of the environment, either through development and use of renewable energy,
environment-friendly technologies, or through improving waste management, drinking
water or sewage systems” (European Commission, 2003a). With the implementation of
such programs structural and environmental policies can work together with clearly
sighted policies. In addition, for central and eastern European countries half of the funds
devoted to the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession are allocated for
environmental projects, especially in the area of wastewater management (European
Commission, 2003a).
  Structural  policy  rules  also  facilitate  the  adherence  to  environmental  standards.
Legislation regarding structural policies includes rules, regulations and directives that
must be followed when implementing structural funds. As a result, structural policies can
push forward adoption of environmental policies since there is legislation within the
structural funds programs to promote the enforcement of environmental concerns. One of19
the highlighted directives involving environmental policy that has been incorporated into
cohesion policy is Natura 2000 (European Commission, 2003a). Natura 2000 is a
directive for the preservation of natural habitats. Before member states or regions receive
funding an assessment must be made regarding the environmental impact of all programs.
  Often  times,  even  without  specific  legislation,  environmental  concerns  are
inadvertently addressed in the implementation of regional funds. For example, funds are
available to renovate economies dependent upon old, dirty industries. In order to receive
funds, member states and regions must agree to improve industrial practices and to
convert their economies to less-environmentally detrimental industrial practices. The
“carrot-stick” mechanism of such funds provides a way for environmental policies to be
achieved that would not normally be done otherwise (Meadows, interview by author,
2003).
  The  similar  goals  of  regional  and  environmental  policy  have  facilitated  greater
cooperation between these policy areas. In addition, the EU has consciously created legal
mechanisms to enforce environmental protection in conjunction with development
policies. As a result, these formal mechanisms have promoted greater coordination
between environmental and regional policies to fulfil the budgetary and policy
effectiveness that accompanies cross-sectoral coordination between regional and
environmental policies.
Enlargement
Enlargement policy is directly related to regional policy. Recent and future accession of
new member countries has created a situation whereby the Regional Policy DG and the
DG for Enlargement will need to work very closely to achieve economic cohesion. The
Director General of Enlargement in 2004, during the accession of ten members, was the
former Director General for Regional Policy, thus facilitating a good working relation
between the two DGs and a common understanding of the goals of each of their DGs. In
addition, the Regional Policy DG realizes that enlargement will increase their own
responsibilities and if not handled properly will adversely affect their own reputation,
thus increasing pressures to coordinate.20
Prior to accession the PHARE program was designed to provide financial support
to reform and rebuild the economies of the new members as well as provide technical
expertise and investment support. The PHARE programs work very differently than
regional development funding, thus coordination between the Regional Policy DG and
the new member states and their regions will be a difficult challenge. New members, on
the whole, are much poorer than past acceding countries, thus they will need heavy
investment in infrastructure and administrative capacity. In addition, weak institutional
capacity and corruption within these systems will also present challenges to coordinating
and implementing regional development policies in these countries.
  As a result of  enlargement the Regional Policy DG has found it necessary  to
coordinate with other DGs that they had not worked with previously: Justice and Home
Affairs and External Affairs. With eastern enlargement, the borders of Europe will
expand along the borders of the Ukraine, Balkans, and Russia, to name a few. These
bordering countries have lower economic development and high crime and corruption.
Thus, the Regional Policy DG has worked with the Justice and Home Affairs and
External Affairs DGs to address the income gap along the frontier and crime issues as
they relate to regional economic development. The Regional Policy DG has attempted to
create a single instrument for border regions of the frontier to promote development to
minimize the negative effects of areas outside of the EU’s borders.
  Due  to  necessity  and  significant  policy  overlap,  regional  policy  and  enlargement
policy have fairly successfully coordinated their activities. In addition, the demands of
enlargement have also necessitated cross-sectoral coordination with areas that had not
been relevant to regional policy. Thus, it seems the demands associated with enlargement
have promoted greater policy coordination across some policy areas.
  Cross-sectoral  policy  coordination  has  experienced  different  levels  of  success
depending on the policy sector. It seems that environmental and enlargement policy have
been most successfully coordinated with regional policy since these policies have similar
goals and in the case of the environment, there are legal requirements that necessitate
coordination. On the other hand, less policy coordination has occurred with agriculture,
research and development, competition and regulatory policies since the goals of these21
policies are very different from those of regional policy and few formal or legal
mechanisms have been created to facilitate coordination.
Conclusion
  Vertical  coordination  among  levels  of  government  and  cross-sectoral  coordination
of regional policy remains a challenge within the EU. Inherent in the territorial nature of
regional policy is the need for coordination among EU institutions, member states and
regions. Often coordination is not as fruitful as it could be due to rivalries and jealousies
between levels of government. Member states attempt to maintain sovereignty over their
own territories. Control over the implementation of EU regional development funds can
affect regional government policymaking ability and often times national governments
would prefer not to devolve so much autonomy to the regional level. As a result, national
governments can use constitutional stipulations as a way to avoid direct coordination
between the EU and regions. In addition, since member states need to maintain
substantive legitimacy and provide “goods” to their constituencies, often times EU
programs or directives may seem counter productive to the member states goals or
agenda. As a result, coordination may also be limited. Although the “partnership
principle” was established to improve coordination among the EU, member states and
regions, with an emphasis on EU-regional coordination, the principle has not been
realized due to territorial jealousies and constitutional limitations that have been used to
reduce regional coordination with the EU.
  The  Regional  Policy  DG  and  innovative  regions  have,  however,  found  ways
around constraints to improve coordination with the EU. EU coordination with regions
has been sought to improve policy implementation and financial management of funds at
the ground level. Regions have attempted to work with the Commission to circumvent
their national government and to also maximize the development of their region.
  Both  regional  administrations  and  the  Regional  Policy  DG  have  developed  ways
to form informal networks to facilitate coordination. Regional lobbying offices, regularly
scheduled meetings with regions, Commissioned sponsored seminars on good practice
and Commission visits to regions to monitor implementation are ways in which
coordination between the EU and regions has been achieved. Through informal22
mechanisms, what has emerged from these kinds of coordination is a network of
individuals at the regional level dedicated to the EU’s goal of regional economic
development.
  Difficulties  surrounding  cross-sectoral  coordination  seem  to  mimic  practices
within member states. For instance, often ministries at the national level act as a series of
silos where little or no coordination occurs. The practice of minimal coordination of
ministries within member states seems to have been transposed to the EU level, thereby
conditioning the DGs to also have minimal coordination (Meadows, interview by author,
2003).
  Another  reason  why  cross-sectoral  coordination may  not  occur  is  that  there  is
often a lack of an evaluation culture in government (Meadows, interview by author,
2003). If a problem arises, the issue is addressed, but it is often not questioned whether
the policy prescription was beneficial. Thus, coordination is often not sought as a way to
improve policies, since policy implementation is often not followed by policy evaluation.
  Coordination  across  policy  sectors  within  the  Commission  varies  depending  on
the kinds of mechanisms available to push coordination and the extent to which policy
goals coincide across sectors. Basically, it seems that pressures for coordination among
DGs have come mostly from functional concerns; however, strategies used to improve or
disband coordination vary depending on the policy sector.
  The  greatest  likelihood  for  cross-sectoral  policy  coordination  seems  to  occur
when legal mechanisms are implemented to force policy sectors to address the interests
of another sector. In the context of enlargement policy, it is in the best interest of regional
policy to coordinate since in the future enlargement policies will most likely fold back
into regional policy. As policy goals diverge or conflict, the possibility and willingness to
coordinate across policy sectors seems to decrease. Likewise, barriers to vertical
coordination emerge due to power struggles among levels of government. To some extent
networks between regions and the Commission have helped to promote greater
coordination across governmental levels, however, domestic institutional will continue to
shape and limit their success.
  The  essential  participation  of  all  levels  of  government  to  ensure  effective  EU
regional policy and the extent to which other policies intersect or conflict with regional23
policy presents a challenge to policy coordination. With continued efforts, however, at
the EU and regional levels to form networks, barriers to vertical coordination may be
lessened. Likewise, as more legal mechanisms, such as those found in EU environmental
policy, push greater coherence and possible coordination of policies, cross-sectoral
coordination may be enhanced. It seems, however, that as long as policy goals conflict
and levels of government seek to protect their competencies there will be little
willingness to have cross-sectoral or vertical coordination without legal pressures or
oversight mechanisms. Thus, some EU policies and actions of various levels of
government will continue to counter the possible positive effects of EU regional policy.24
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1.   Another significant difference between EU social and regional policy is the
national model each adopted. EU social policy tends to take a “top-down” approach more
likened to the Franco-Italian model, whereas, regional policy has a “bottom-up” approach
likened to the Irish-British model (White, interview by author, 2003). The difference in
models certainly makes sense since these policies were initiated by certain member states
and thus the policy coordination is likewise reflective of those countries’ practices.
2.  Member  states  certainly  welcome  structural  funds,  but  are  resentful  of  the  “partnership  principle”
and the attempt to give regions a stronger role. For instance, when discussion of reforming regional
development funds occurred Spain explicitly pressured for more cohesion funds as opposed to structural
funds since cohesion funds travel directly to national coffers; thereby strengthening the national
government’s ability to distribute funds.